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Governor of the Bank of Japan
I. Introduction
Good morning. I am very pleasedto addressthe Bank of Japan international conference.
On behalf of my colleagues at the Bank of Japan, I welcome all the participants from
central banks, international organizations, and academia.
The global ﬁnancial crisis which started in the summer of 2007 poses a renewed but
fundamental question on the role of a central bank. This year’s conference focuses on
this timely theme of “Future of Central Banking under Globalization.”
In exploring the future of central banks, I set my benchmark at the monetary and
ﬁnancial system and the environment surrounding central banks at the time when I
started my career at the Bank of Japan in 1972. In those days, on the monetary policy
front, central banks did not obtain sufﬁcient understanding and support about their
primary objective of achieving price stability from politicians and the public at large.
In the mid-1970s, shortly thereafter, double-digit inﬂation became a crucial challenge
for central banks in major countries. And many central banks were yet to establish their
independence. The foreign exchange rate system for the advanced countries was in a
transition period from the adjustable peg under the Bretton Woods system to theﬂoating
rates. As for the ﬁnancial system, the banks’ activities were still highly regulated, and
the memory of a ﬁnancial crisis became faded just as a remote past event.
The situation changed signiﬁcantly after that.
1 Macroeconomic performance im-
proved considerably. Many central banks established their independence, and suc-
ceeded in improving the understanding on their role from politicians and the public.
“Quiet Revolution” called by Alan Blinder can be understood along such a trend.
2 The
theory of monetary policy also advanced considerably.
3
Just when we feel comfortable with the positive developments, which just I men-
tioned, the situation has already been changing gradually, thereby posing a new chal-
lenge for central banks. That is, asset-price and credit bubbles and subsequent economic
1. Cagliarini, Kent, and Stevens (2010), Caruana (2010), and Crockett (2010) provide excellent reviews on
development in the macroeconomy, the ﬁnancial system, and the international currency system, respectively.
2. See Blinder (2004).
3. Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999) say that research on monetary policy reaches a stage of a “science of
monetary policy” by establishing a number of useful principles for optimal monetary policy with fairly
general applicability.
MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/NOVEMBER 2010
DO NOT REPRINT OR REPRODUCE WITHOUT PERMISSION 17stagnation and ﬁnancial crises after the burst of bubbles. Japan faced that challenge
ﬁrst, and then countries in various parts of the world experienced similar challenges
one after another.
In view of the current global ﬁnancial crisis, we clearly know that we are facing the
new challenge. But, to what extent did central bank policymakers predict the current
situation a couple of decades ago? Instead of venturing into a long-term future, I will
rather narrow my focus on a near-term future.
II. Performance of Central Banks
Central banks in the world do not play the exactly same roles, reﬂecting their historical
backgrounds. But to consider the nature of modern central banking, we need to focus
on three aspects. First, a central bank provides central bank money with ultimate safety
and liquidity and operates payment and settlement systems. Second, a central bank
conducts monetary policy to guide the level of interest rates for achieving price stability.
Third, a central bank plays a key role in maintaining ﬁnancial system stability. About
the third role, a central bank has a unique role as a lender of last resort, and, more
or less, it shares the important role of ﬁnancial regulation and supervision. I begin by
reviewing the performance of central banks in the three areas.
A. Central Bank Money and Payment and Settlement Systems
First, speaking of central bank money and payment and settlement systems, large-value
payments settled through central bank accounts have increased signiﬁcantly, reﬂecting
the growing ﬁnancial market transactions. At the same time, the settlement methods
have also changed drastically. In the early 1970s, only the Fedwire, run by the U.S. Fed-
eral Reserve System, employed the real-time gross settlement (RTGS) system, which
immediately settles funds transfer instructions between central bank accounts on an
instruction-by-instruction basis. Most of the remaining systems employed the deferred
net settlement (DNS) system, which settles funds transfer instructions between central
bank accounts on a netted amount basis at ﬁxed points in time. The Bank of Japan
carried out most of settlements either at nine o’clock in the morning, one or three
o’clock in the afternoon.
4 However, most of the central banks in the world, including
the Bank of Japan, have moved to RTGS systems.
5
As for foreign exchange transactions, Continuous Linked Settlement (CLS) started
its operation in 2002. The system settles foreign exchange transactions in 17 currencies
on a payment-versus-payment (PVP) basis between seven o’clock in the morning to
noon, central European time. Those ﬁxed hours, which were enabled by the extension
of operating hours of central bank systems, are often called the “ﬁve-hour window”
linking settlements on the globe.
TheobservationsjustImentioned,areverylimited,buttheyclearlyshowadramatic
improvement in the safety and efﬁciency of payment and settlement systems. That was
4. The settlement time at ﬁve o’clock was introduced in 1993 when the Zengin system moved from next-day
settlement to same-day settlement.
5. See Shirakawa (2009).
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proven resilient under the current ﬁnancial crisis, as a result of steady and tremendous
efforts to reduce settlement risk by all the parties concerned in the past.
B. Monetary Policy
Next, let me move on to reviewing the performance of monetary policy. Although inﬂa-
tion accelerated from the 1970s to the early 1980s, it then started declining noticeably
around the mid-1980s. In the 1990s, inﬂation came down to alow and stablelevel where
central banks in major countries could declare a victory in the battle against inﬂation. In
parallel, public understanding about monetary policy was enhanced in two points: price
stability as the primary objective, and the importance of central bank independence
to that end.
However,bubbleshaveoftenemergedsincecentralbanksjustwonthebattleagainst
inﬂation. As I mentioned earlier, Japan ﬁrst experienced that problem in the second half
of the 1980s. Around that time, Japan delivered a remarkably good macroeconomic per-
formance, compared with other advanced countries. Real GDP growth reached 5.1 per-
cent in Japan, while the average of other G-7 countries stayed at 3.4 percent. Consumer
price index (CPI) inﬂation came down to 1.1 percent in Japan, while the average of
other G-7 countries remained at 3.9 percent. Japan received high marks in performance
criteria for inﬂation targeting, which would prevail later on.
At that time, there was debate about the necessity of exiting extremely accommoda-
tive monetary policy in Japan. In fact, all the macroeconomic indicators except for one
showed the necessity of withdrawing monetary easing: high economic growth, tight
labor market conditions, rapidly growing bank lending, and bloated asset prices. The
outlier indicator, however, was exactly CPI inﬂation. As a result, low inﬂation stood
against the Bank of Japan, and delayed the policy reversal toward tightening. What
happened later on was the expansion and burst of an asset-price and credit bubble and
the subsequent ﬁnancial crisis. Since then, many countries had the same experience that
price stability would not automatically ensure macroeconomic stability.
To digress a little bit, before the current crisis, a safety margin against the zero lower
bound of nominal interest rates was often pointed out as one of the justiﬁcations for tar-
geting asmallbutpositiverateofinﬂation. Intheend,major countriesfound themselves
virtually constrained by the zero lower bound under the current crisis. Looking back at
the serious economic downturn after the failure of Lehman Brothers, very few think that
reducing interest rates by a few percentage points, enabled by having a higher target
rate of inﬂation, would have materially changed a recovery path of the economy.
6 That
suggests how devastating damage ﬁnancial system instability inﬂicts on the economy.
We have learnt two things from our experiences in the last few decades. First,
price stability and ﬁnancial system stability are both prerequisites for macroeconomic
stability. Second, price stability itself is desirable, but it entails a complex mechanism
for destabilizing the ﬁnancial system, if combined with over-conﬁdence in economic
agents and unfounded expectations about the prolonged low interest rates.
7
6. Blanchard, Dell’Ariccia, and Mauro (2010) point out that it is necessary to examine costs and beneﬁts of raising
an inﬂation target in light of the current ﬁnancial crisis.
7. See White (2006).
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So, I will move on to reviewing the performance of central banks in the third role, the
achievement of ﬁnancial system stability. In the early 1970s, a major ﬁnancial crisis
seemed remote to many countries, including Japan. Of course, some ﬁnancial crises
occurred after that, such as the Secondary Banking Crisis in the United Kingdom and
the S&L Crisis in the United States, while they were far from a full-ﬂedged crisis af-
fecting the entire economy and the ﬁnancial system. Such a situation, however, changed
signiﬁcantly in the 1990s.
First, ﬁnancial crises have occurred more frequently than before. That is apparent
from the recent episodes: Japan’s crisis, the Nordic crisis, the East Asian crisis, the
LTCM crisis, the Russian crisis, and the current global ﬁnancial crisis. In addition,
ﬁnancial crises have increased their magnitude.
Second, ﬁnancial crises have occurred on a more global scale than before. Japan’s
ﬁnancial crisis was an isolated event for the global ﬁnancial system, albeit a serious
event for Japan. However, the subsequent crises strengthened their global nature. The
crisis after the failure of Lehman Brothers was truly a global ﬁnancial crisis.
Third, ﬁnancial crises have a bit different nature, compared with the past. Financial
crises always surface in the form of a liquidity shortage. Under the current crisis, the
shortage of market liquidity, in addition to funding liquidity, did matter. In addition,
such liquidity shortage became extremely acute in the shadow banking system, which
is outside the traditional banking sector.
III. New and Difﬁcult Challenges from Success
As the last couple of decades show, central banks have achieved a great success in
stabilizing prices as well as economic activity. As a result of such success, central
banks seem to ironically face new and difﬁcult challenges.
8 I will next explain such
difﬁcult challenges.
A. Changes in the Manifestation of Economic Imbalances
First, the imbalances in the economy are unlikely to appear immediately in the form of
imbalances in general prices. A benign macroeconomic condition tends to make eco-
nomic agents irrationally bullish, and change their risk perception in a laxer direction.
Low inﬂation, however, tends to delay the reversal of easy monetary policy. Under
such a situation, overconﬁdence, if created by some reasons, ignites an increase in asset
prices, expansion of credit and leverage, and extension of maturity mismatches. If the
imbalances in the economy had appeared in the form of a rise in general prices, a
central bank would have relatively easily been able to respond by orthodox monetary
tightening. The imbalances in the economy, however, appeared in the form of ﬁnancial
imbalances. Then, why have general prices become less responsive to the imbalances
in the economy?
8. Shirakawa (2010) points out a mechanism of so-called the “cycle of conﬁdence” behind the bubble and
ﬁnancial crisis.
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One reason, often pointed out, lies in the enhanced credibility for a central bank
in conducting monetary policy. In that case, ﬁrms do not change their product prices
immediately, when they perceive general price ﬂuctuations as just temporary. Another
reason is related to the tendency toward non-price competition. Firms are concerned
that a simple raise in the prices results in losing their customer bases in a low inﬂation
environment, and that a simple reduction in the prices just invites subsequent price
reductions by competitors.
Although I basically agree with the analyses, just I mentioned, I conjecture that
a more fundamental reason lies in the fact that price measurement itself has become
hard in recent years. Of course, in theory, the price index is supposed to trace quality-
adjusted prices over time. In practice, however, value added and attendant risk are hard
to be identiﬁed, as the economy becomes more information-driven, service-oriented,
and network-intensive.
9 A case in point is ﬁnancial services consumers purchase from
ﬁnancial institutions. Financial services are about risk assessment. As our experience of
the ﬁnancial crisis shows, however, such risk assessment turned out to be inadequate. If
an ideal quality adjustment method had been available to us, quality-adjusted prices
of ﬁnancial services would have increased reﬂecting their declined quality. Such a
statistical treatment has hardly been implemented in practice, and the situation seems
to remain the same in the future.
B. Policy Responses after the Burst of a Bubble
The second difﬁcult challenge is that a policy response, if successful in the short term,
does not necessarily imply a success in the long term. Central banks moved swiftly
and aggressively, countering a serious economic downturn stemming from the burst of
the bubble. We have to be aware that such policy responses could cause other risks,
including the emergence of an asset-price and credit bubble. Given the increase in the
frequency and magnitude of bubbles since the 1990s, I mentioned earlier, we need to
have a longer time horizon to tell whether a policy response will succeed or not.
C. Central Bank in Democratic Society
The third difﬁcult challenge is related to the fact that a success in policy re-
sponses poses a new problem as to what responsibility a central bank should bear in
democratic society.
Confronted with the ﬁnancial and economic crises, central banks in major coun-
tries have all introduced unconventional policy measures. In that regard, the Bank of
Japan was the ﬁrst to experience a ﬁnancial crisis, and, thus, was the ﬁrst to employ
unprecedented measures. Since the late 1990s, the Bank of Japan has been moving ag-
gressively as a lender of last resort, including the funds provision to the securities ﬁrm.
The Bank of Japan also launched various unprecedented measures, such as a stock
purchase program from ﬁnancial institutions and the outright purchase of asset-backed
commercial papers and asset-backed securities. Thus, it is my regret that innovations
in the Bank of Japan’s policy responses have not been well recognized. In fact, under
the current ﬁnancial crisis, major central banks have also taken unprecedented policy
measures, just like the Bank of Japan did.
9. See Varian (2001).
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elements, such as potential taxpayers’ burden incurred by a loss from such operations,
and intervention in resource allocation at a micro level. In the midst of a crisis, a central
bank faces growing demand for introducing unconventional policy measures, which
involve more or less quasi-ﬁscal policy elements. Since a central bank generally thinks
that such measures need to be decided and implemented by government in democratic
society, a central bank falls into a difﬁcult position, when decisions by government are
just postponed.
The border between pure monetary policy and quasi-ﬁscal policy sometimes be-
comes ambiguous. Looking back at the experiences of various countries since the
1990s, when their central bank law had clauses for making some quasi-ﬁscal policy
measures possible, they decided to carry out such measures after careful consideration.
Once a crisis was overcome, with the help of such unconventional policy measures,
central banks were criticized for violating the fundamental rule in democratic society.
As a result, such a situation is likely to undermine credibility for central banks, and thus
affect their policy performance.
IV. Tasks for Central Banks
As I discussed so far, central banks face new and difﬁcult challenges at the moment.
With considering such difﬁcult challenge, I will point out some tasks in addressing
such difﬁcult challenges.
A. Understanding of a Primary Mandate for a Central Bank
The ﬁrst is the understanding of a primary mandate for a central bank. Without social
understanding on that point, central bank independence and, eventually, central bank
credibility itself are likely to be undermined.
I think that a primary mandate for a central bank should be to achieve a stable ﬁnan-
cial environment, that is, a ﬁnancial environment that is consistent with, and contributes
to, sustainable economic growth. Price stability is certainly one important element in
achieving a stable ﬁnancial environment. That is, however, not the sole factor. When a
central bank feels constrained by short-term developments too much, that is more likely
to amplify macroeconomic ﬂuctuations.
After all, deposit money, which has a major share in broad money, is created as a
product of maturity mismatches and leverage of private ﬁnancial institutions. A central
bank needs to adequately monitor the ﬁnancial environment, including such behavior of
ﬁnancial institutions. Macroprudential perspectives, recently reemphasized in light of
the current global ﬁnancial crisis, should be understood as examining the interactions
between the real and ﬁnancial sides of the economy, considering the behavior of private
ﬁnancial institutions. Such an analysis is an essential task for a central bank, although
it is a typical example of “easier said than done.” In addition, macroprudential anal-
yses and perspectives are crucially important in conducting monetary policy as well as
designing ﬁnancial regulations and supervising ﬁnancial institutions.
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B. Financial Infrastructure
The second is the efforts to improve the ﬁnancial infrastructure. In achieving a stable
ﬁnancial environment, while monetary policy certainly plays an important role, we
need to avoid overstating the effectiveness of the ﬁne-tuning policy, given our in-
complete knowledge. As is well known, we have difﬁculty in measuring the output
gap and inﬂation in an accurate manner. It is even more so in projecting such indica-
tors. We also need to pay attention to the risk of destabilizing the economy, due to a
recognition lag.
By contrast, we can count more on assured beneﬁts from enhancing the ﬁnancial
infrastructure, as evident from the observation that such efforts are very effective in
staving off the aggravation of the current global ﬁnancial crisis. In that respect, one of
the most important tasks is to improve cross-border funding markets.
C. International Monetary System
In discussing the future of central banking, I cannot conclude my speech without
touching upon the international monetary system.
10 In that regard, we sometimes hear
the arguments for macroeconomic policy coordination to facilitate the adjustments
of global imbalances. The current-account imbalances themselves are an adjustment
mechanism for the differences in savings and investment patterns due to the variations
in the level of economic growth and demographics between countries. So the im-
balances themselves are not necessarily evil. What should be adjusted is unsustainable
imbalances, but, as the current global ﬁnancial crisis shows, those imbalances are
caused primarily by internal imbalances, reﬂecting inappropriate management of
macroeconomic policy and ﬁnancial regulations and supervisions. I well understand
the necessity of reforming the international monetary system as a long-term task, but
I should emphasize the bottom line that each country should make every effort to put
its own house in order.
Having said that, we need to recognize new challenges we are facing in an inter-
national context. As the role of globally operating ﬁnancial institutions and investors
expands, easy monetary policy in one country comes to inﬂuence other countries. We
thus observe a phenomenon that the insulating effect of the ﬂoating exchange system
does not always work perfectly, as it is described in textbooks. One example is the
growing effects of carry trade. Considering such changes in the transmission channel of
monetary policy, Iam wondering whetherandto whatextentweneed toalterour wayof
thinking on monetary policy management for the advanced countries or an international
key currency country. That seems to remain an open question.
V. Institutional Culture for a Central Bank
As discussed so far, central banks are facing wide-ranging challenges. In any event, the
ﬁat money system is a system to control money with wisdom. To that end, the institu-
tional culture and human capital accumulation in such culture are crucially important
10. We see some renewed interests in the international monetary system. See, for example, Padoa-Schioppa (2010)
for that line of arguments.
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11 In closing my remarks today, let me touch upon some aspects of
the institutional culture for a central bank I deem important.
The ﬁrst aspect in the central bank culture is banking operations. A central bank
is not just an ivory tower to discuss the macroeconomy and the ﬁnancial system in an
abstract manner. Rather, a central bank itself is a bank, which implements policy actions
through banking operations, as in the case of monetary policy as well as a lender of last
resort. Those operations require wide-ranging operational knowledge, such as collateral
haircut setting, counterparty selection, payment and settlement of funds and securities,
and debt-collection from failed ﬁnancial institutions.
In addition, such knowledge is also useful in assessing the subtle working of the
ﬁnancial system and its interaction with the macroeconomy. In introductory textbooks,
money is described as a mechanical concept just as a product of the monetary base
and the money multiplier. Such a way of understanding of money misses the important
role played by money. As I noted earlier, money is created as a product of maturity
mismatches and leverage in ﬁnancial transactions. That implies that a central bank
is unable to understand developments in the ﬁnancial system and the macroeconomy
without hands-on knowledge on how banks operate. The current global ﬁnancial crisis
clearly shows that point.
The second aspect is to keep learning. The economy, including the ﬁnancial system
and ﬁnancial markets, is changing all the time. When we have conﬁdence in acquiring
knowledge on something, the situation has already started changing before we know it.
One such example is ﬁnancial system instability after achieving price stability.
We are unable to write fully state-contingent rules and contracts. Actual markets
are inevitably incomplete markets in economists’ terminology. A central bank can
be regarded as a device for dealing with such incompleteness. If that is the case, a
central bank needs to make use of all the available knowledge in understanding the
developments in the economy and their implications, and mapping out necessary pol-
icy actions. Thus, a central bank needs to put emphasis on the institutional culture of
constant learning.
12
The third aspect is the integration of wide-ranging areas of knowledge. Taking an
example of monetary policy, a central bank generally relies heavily on the macro-
economic theory in conducting monetary policy. The economic theory plays an im-
portant role in providing a framework for understanding a complex world. At the same
time, we should be careful that sticking to one speciﬁc theory potentially distorts our
views. Historical knowledge is also useful. Looking back at the history of ﬁnancial
crises, we are stunned by the common mentality of “this time is different.”
13 In addition,
knowledge on banking operations, just I mentioned, is also indispensable. A central
bank needs to make constant efforts to produce synergy effects between monetary pol-
icy and prudential policy wings by overcoming some differences in the cultures of the
two policy wings.
11. Williamson (1999) discusses the governance of public institutions. Oritani (2010) analyzes the governance and
organization of a central bank using the institutional economics.
12. See King (2005) for the importance of learning for central banks.
13. See Reinhart and Rogoff (2009).
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The fourth aspect is cooperation among central banks. We expect that economic
activity and ﬁnancial market transactions will continue to grow across borders, but
we do not imagine that sovereign nations will disappear in the foreseeable future. In
that case, cooperation between central banks will become increasingly important in
achieving ﬁnancial system stability. Under the current global ﬁnancial crisis, central
banks have communicated with each other intensively at various levels, from top central
bankers to mid-class staffers, which surely becomes considerable wealth for the future
of the central bank community.
VI. Closing Remarks
Central bank conferences reﬂect the institutional culture of central banks, and this con-
ference entails such aspects more clearly with its title of “Future of Central Banking.”
I am convinced that the one-and-a-half-day conference will give us profound insights
into the future of central banks and central banking.
Thank you very much.
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